Mercer Law Review
Volume 55
Number 1 Annual Survey of Georgia Law

Article 10

12-2003

Evidence
Marc T. Treadwell

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr
Part of the Evidence Commons

Recommended Citation
Treadwell, Marc T. (2003) "Evidence," Mercer Law Review: Vol. 55 : No. 1 , Article 10.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr/vol55/iss1/10

This Survey Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Mercer Law School Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Mercer Law Review by an authorized editor of Mercer Law School
Digital Commons. For more information, please contact repository@law.mercer.edu.

Evidence

by Marc T. Treadwell*
I. INTRODUCTION
This survey period saw no dramatic developments. The necessity
exception to the hearsay rule continued to catch within its net statements that, a generation ago, would never have seen the light of a
courtroom day. However, there were hints that some appellate justices
and judges are becoming increasingly uncomfortable with the broad
scope of the necessity exception. With regard to expert testimony,
Georgia courts continued their refusal to adopt Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals,Inc.,' perhaps because of a reluctance to impose on
trial court judges the tremendous burden of microscopic analysis of
proffered expert testimony.
II.

OBJECTIONS

Motions in limine are invaluable tools for resolving evidentiary issues
out of the presence of jurors. Little is accomplished by a successful
objection to proffered evidence when the jury has already heard the
evidence. Used properly, motions in limine can exclude objectionable
evidence before trial. However, as discussed in previous surveys,
motions in limine have to be used with an eye on preserving objections
for appeal, a point
made by the court of appeals this survey period in
2

Hand v. Pettitt.
In Hand, a civil suit for battery, plaintiff, during his opening
statement, referred to defendant's noxious conduct on occasions other
than the occasion at issue. Somewhat after the horse had left the barn,
defendant moved in limine to exclude the evidence. The trial court

* Partner in the firm of Adams, Jordan & Treadwell, Macon, Georgia. Valdosta State
University (B.A., 1978); Walter F. George School of Law, Mercer University (J.D., cum
laude, 1981). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
2. 258 Ga. App. 170, 573 S.E.2d 421 (2002).
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denied the motion.' The court of appeals noted that a motion in limine
can be used in two ways. 4 First, an attorney can ask the court to
prohibit any mention of the evidence in the presence of the jury until the
admissibility of the evidence has been determined.5 Second, an attorney
can seek a final ruling on the admissibility of evidence.6 In the case of
the latter, the trial court should deny the motion unless there are no
circumstances under which the evidence would be admissible, and thus,
the movant carries a heavy burden.7 "The trial court has an absolute
right to refuse to decide the admissibility of evidence, allegedly violating
some ordinary rule of evidence, prior to trial, because the evidence has
not been tendered in the context of evidence already admitted, which
may make the evidence admissible for certain purposes."8 In Hand the
court of appeals concluded that defendant, when he moved in limine to
exclude the evidence after the jury had heard the evidence during
opening statements, was in effect seeking an absolute pretrial ruling on
the admissibility of the evidence.9 In other words, defendant was
asking the trial court to find that the evidence was not admissible under
any circumstances. 10 The court of appeals concluded that defendant
could not meet his heavy burden of establishing that the evidence at
issue was not, under any conceivable scenario, admissible.1
III.

JuDiciAL NOTICE

Lawyers are accustomed to simply citing the statutes and cases upon
which they rely, and it is all too easy to forget that Georgia courts
cannot always take judicial notice of legislative or judicial materials.
This lesson was learned the hard way in Collier v. Merck. 2 In Collier
defendant appealed his conviction in a county recorder's court for
violating a county ordinance. On writ of certiorari to the court of
appeals, defendant contended that the evidence was insufficient to
warrant his conviction. 3 However, the court of appeals did not address
this issue because the record did not contain the substance of the

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Id. at 171, 573 S.E.2d at 425.
Id. at 172, 573 S.E.2d at 425.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 173, 573 S.E.2d at 426.
Id. at 172, 573 S.E.2d at 426.
Id.
Id. at 173, 573 S.E.2d at 426.
261 Ga. App. 831, 584 S.E.2d 1 (2003).
Id. at 831, 584 S.E.2d at 2.
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ordinance defendant had allegedly violated.14 The court noted that
neither a superior court nor an appellate court could take judicial notice
of a local ordinance.1 5 Rather, it is incumbent upon the party seeking
to prove the terms of the ordinance to
ensure that the substance of the
16
ordinance is contained in the record.
IV.

PRiVLEGES

Georgia law recognizes a clergy privilege: "[E]very communication
made by any person professing religious faith, seeking spiritual comfort,
or seeking counseling" 7 to a member of the clergy shall be deemed
privileged. 8 In Morris v. State, 9 defendant contended that the trial
court improperly denied his motion in limine seeking to exclude from
evidence his conversations with one Reverend Boyd.2" On appeal, the
supreme court sided with the trial court.2' The evidence showed that
defendant had known the Reverend for years, long before he became a
clergyman, and considered him to be a father figure. Indeed, the
Reverend was never defendant's pastor.22 The supreme court also
relied on the fact that when defendant called Reverend Boyd, the
Reverend asked defendant why he called, and defendant responded
"'because you're the only father figure I've ever had."'22 This suggests
that the supreme court relied on the substance of the communications
to decide that the communications did not fall within the clergy
privilege.24 In any event, the supreme court held that the trial court
properly concluded that defendant's statements to Reverend Boyd were
not subject to the protection of the clergy privilege because they were not
made to the Reverend in his capacity as a clergyman.2

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id.
Id.
Id.
O.C.G.A. § 24-9-22 (1995).
Id.
275 Ga. 601, 571 S.E.2d 358 (2002).
Id. at 602, 571 S.E.2d at 359.
Id.
Id.
Id., 571 S.E.2d at 360.
Id.
Id.
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RELEVANCY

Relevancy of Extrinsic Act Evidence

The use of extrinsic act evidence-evidence of what someone did on an
occasion other than the one at issue-is now routinely admitted in
criminal cases. As discussed in last year's survey,2 even the seemingly
sacrosanct principle that extrinsic act evidence cannot be used to prove
a defendant's propensity to commit criminal acts has been called into
question.2 7 In Carr v. State,2 Judge Eldridge argued that "'propensity' can be a sufficient basis for the admission of a similar transaction."29 Perhaps drawing a distinction too fine to be meaningful to
defendants and their attorneys, Judge Eldridge wrote that propensity
evidence is permissible when offered to show course of conduct or intent,
and the "evil to be avoided is . . . admission of a similar transaction
simply to demonstrate a predisposition to commit an offense that the
defendant committed in the past, i.e., he did it before, so he did it this
time as well."3" Defense lawyers likely will lament that if extrinsic act
evidence can be offered to prove propensity, then any meaningful
obstacle to the use of such evidence has been removed. However, two
decisions rendered during the survey period may suggest, at least on the
part of some appellate judges, a reluctance to adopt the continued and
expanded use of extrinsic act evidence.
In Mika v. State,"' defendant argued that the trial court improperly
admitted evidence of his conviction for selling cocaine some eight years
prior to the current charged offense of selling cocaine.32 The majority
held that the first offense was sufficiently similar to the charged offense
to be admissible similar transaction evidence.3" The "mere" lapse of
time between the two offenses did not render the prior offense too remote
to be admissible.3
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Phipps, joined by
Judge Miller, strongly criticized the majority.35 The majority, Judge

26. Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 54 MERCER L. REv. 309 (2002).
27. Carr v. State, 251 Ga. App. 117, 121, 553 S.E.2d 674, 677 (2001) (Eldridge, J.,
concurring specially), discussed in Treadwell, 54 MERCER L. REV., supra note 26, at 312.
28. 251 Ga. App. 117, 553 S.E.2d 674 (2001).
29. Id. at 121, 553 S.E.2d at 677 (Eldridge, J., concurring specially).
30. Id., 553 S.E.2d at 677-78 (Eldridge, J., concurring specially).
31. 256 Ga. App. 546, 568 S.E.2d 818 (2002).
32. Id. at 547, 568 S.E.2d at 821.
33. Id. at 548, 568 S.E.2d at 821.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 553, 568 S.E.2d at 824 (Phipps, J., dissenting).
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Phipps wrote, did not analyze the prior offense in the light of the
purpose for which it was admitted, i.e., to show defendant's intent,
course of conduct, bent of mind, and modus operandi.3" A proper
analysis, Judge Phipps argued, revealed that the evidence was not
admissible for those purposes.3" Defendant did not contend that he
lacked the intent to commit the crime, but rather he denied that he
committed the act of selling cocaine. Consequently, intent and bent of
mind were not disputed issues, and the prior offense was not relevant to
prove intent or bent of mind. 8 With regard to course of conduct, the
admission of extrinsic act evidence contemplates continuous conduct
closely connected to the charged offense, and an eight-year old offense
hardly met this criterion. 9 For similar transaction evidence to be
relevant to prove modus operandi, the prior offense must be "'so nearly
identical in method [as the crime charged] as to earmark them as the
handy work of the accused,'" 4 ° and the two offenses were not that
similar.41 To Judge Phipps, the "real role which the extrinsic crime
evidence played at trial was simply to show that Mika had sold cocaine
before, 42thereby permitting the jury to infer that he had done so
again.
The contention that intent can be removed as an issue, and thus as a
basis for the admission of extrinsic act evidence, has arisen before. In
Evans v. State,43 the trial court admitted similar transaction evidence
to establish intent to engage in the sale of cocaine and to establish state
of mind." In a dissenting opinion, Judges Beasley and Cooper argued
that the charged offense-sale of cocaine-did not require specific intent,
and thus, intent was not an issue.45 State of mind was also not an
issue because defendant did not dispute that a drug sale took place;
rather, defendant contended that he did not participate in the sale.
Thus, the similar transaction evidence was not sufficiently relevant to
a legitimate issue to outweigh its inherent prejudicial impact."
Interestingly, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh

36. Id. at 555, 568 S.E.2d at 826 (Phipps, J., dissenting).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 554, 568 S.E.2d at 825 (Phipps, J., dissenting).
40. Id. at 555, 568 S.E.2d at 826 (quoting Felker v. State, 252 Ga. 351, 360, 314 S.E.2d
621 (1984)) (Phipps, J., dissenting).
41. Id. (Phipps, J., dissenting).
42. Id. (Phipps, J., dissenting).
43. 209 Ga. App. 606, 434 S.E.2d 148 (1993).
44. Id. at 607, 434 S.E.2d at 149.
45. Id. at 608, 434 S.E.2d at 150 (Beasley, J., dissenting).
46. Id.
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Circuit has consistently rejected this argument, holding that a plea of
not guilty generally makes an issue of intent and thus warrants the
introduction of extrinsic act evidence.47
The court of appeals decision in Pitts v. State4" also prompted a
vigorous dissent. In Pitts the defendant, who was charged with various
drug offenses, argued that his trial attorney should have moved for a
mistrial after a co-defendant, in response to questioning from her lawyer,
testified that defendant sold drugs for a living.49 A majority of the
court of appeals rejected this contention, concluding that the evidence
was admissible, even though the trial court sustained defendant's
objection to the evidence.5 ° The majority reasoned that because
defendant was charged with trafficking, which implied that he sold
cocaine, the evidence that defendant sold drugs for a living was relevant
to establish that he was a drug trafficker.5 The evidence was not
extrinsic act evidence, the court continued, but rather was evidence that
"went to the gravamen of the charges against him ....
Arguably, this holding pushes the envelope, and it certainly pushed
Judges Barnes and Ellington to dissent. "We are unable to see any
purpose for the testimony other than as inadmissible evidence of Pitts's
propensity to sell drugs."53 The dissenters simply did not accept the
contention that a general statement that a defendant sold drugs for a
living could go to the "gravamen" of the charges against defendant.5 4
Clearly, the evidence was extrinsic act evidence, and there was no basis
for its admission as character evidence, similar transaction evidence, or
as part of the res gestae.5"
In Putnam v. State,56 Judge Eldridge authored a decision illustrating
his contention that similar transaction evidence can be admissible as
propensity evidence.57 In Putnam the defendant was charged with
vehicular homicide, with reckless driving as the underlying offense.
Defendant also pleaded guilty to two speeding counts in the indictment.

47. See, e.g., Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 38 MERCER L. REV. 1253, 1259-60 (1987);
Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 40 MERCER L. REV. 1291, 1299 (1989); Marc T. Treadwell,
Evidence, 43 MERCER L. REV. 1173, 1175-76 (1992).
48. 260 Ga. App. 553, 580 S.E.2d 618 (2003).
49. Id. at 560, 580 S.E.2d at 626.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 563, 580 S.E.2d at 628.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 567, 580 S.E.2d at 631 (Ellington, J., dissenting).
54. Id., 580 S.E.2d at 630 (Ellington, J., dissenting).
55. Id., 580 S.E.2d at 631 (Ellington, J., dissenting).
56. 257 Ga. App. 902, 572 S.E.2d 412 (2002).
57. Id. at 902-04, 572 S.E.2d at 414-16.
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At trial, the court admitted evidence of his eleven prior acts of speeding
as similar transaction evidence. On appeal, defendant contended that
because he pleaded guilty to the speeding counts in the indictment, his
prior speeding convictions were no longer relevant and that they were
not sufficiently similar to the charged offense.5"
Judge Eldridge
rejected these contentions.5 9 First, speeding can be a factor in proving
the offense of reckless driving.6 ° Thus, the evidence of his prior
speeding convictions was potentially relevant.6 ' In his analysis of the
prior convictions, Judge Eldridge repeatedly used language suggesting
that prior speeding convictions were admissible if they showed a
propensity or habit of speeding.62 Speeding convictions "can demonstrate a course of conduct wherein a defendant routinely drives his car
in a manner exhibiting a disregard for the safety of persons or property."6" Defendant's numerous speeding convictions "demonstrated a
repeated pattern of ignoring posted safe speeds, thereby exhibiting a
disregard for the safety of persons or property."'
B.

Relevancy of Subsequent Remedial Measures

In Georgia, evidence of subsequent remedial measures is generally
inadmissible in negligence actions, 5 but in McCorkle v. Department of
Transportation,6 plaintiffs contended that the trial court improperly
used this rule to exclude admissible evidence. In McCorkle the trial
court refused to admit a Department of Transportation ("DOT")
memorandum recommending certain improvements, including the
installation of a traffic light at an intersection where a fatal collision had
occurred. Plaintiffs contended that the memorandum did not constitute
a subsequent remedial measure because the traffic light had not been
installed.6 7 However, the court noted that although the DOT did not
follow the precise recommendations of the memorandum, it did embark

58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 903, 572 S.E.2d at 415.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 903-04, 572 S.E.2d at 415-16.
63. Id. at 903, 572 S.E.2d at 415.
64. Id. at 904, 572 S.E.2d at 416.
65. General Motors Corp. v. Moseley, 213 Ga. App. 875, 880, 447 S.E.2d 302, 308
(1994), discussed in Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 47 MERCER L. REV. 127, 137-38 (1995).
The Georgia rule differs from FED. R. EvID. 407, which bars the admission of evidence of
subsequent remedial measures in both negligence and strict liability actions. Wood v.
Morbark Indus., Inc., 70 F.3d 1201 (11th Cir. 1995).
66. 257 Ga. App. 397, 571 S.E.2d 160 (2002).
67. Id. at 399, 571 S.E.2d at 163.
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on a safety improvement program that would eventually result in the
installation of a traffic light at the intersection; although, at the time of
trial, more than three years after the collision, the light had not been
installed.6" With no further discussion, the court of appeals held that
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the memorandum.69 The court's opinion suggests, although it certainly did not hold,
that if a defendant proposes but chooses not to implement a subsequent
remedial measure, then that proposal may be admissible.
VI.
A.

WITNESSES

Impeaching One's Own Witness

Georgia law provides that a party may impeach his own witness
"where he can show to the court that he has been entrapped by said
witness by a previous contradictory statement."0 However, "entrapment" does not mean surprise, and a party may impeach his own witness
with a prior inconsistent statement even though he knows in advance
that the witness's testimony will conflict with the prior statement.7 1
The court of appeals illustrated this principle in Black v. State.72 In
Black the defendant, who was charged with child molestation, contended
that the trial court improperly allowed the prosecution to impeach the
testimony of his mother. The prosecution called defendant's mother to
examine her about the events of the evening of the alleged molestation.
When the mother denied that defendant had admitted the molestation
to her, the prosecution called two investigators who testified that
defendant's mother told them defendant had admitted touching the
victim." There can be little doubt the prosecution called the mother to
the stand as a vehicle to secure the admission of her statement to the
investigators. However, the court of appeals held that the prosecution
did not need to establish that it was surprised by the mother's testimony
to gain the right to impeach her testimony.74 "Entrapment" simply
means "'at the time of the questioning, [a party] has knowledge of a
prior statement by one of [its]
witnesses which contradicts testimony
75
that witness has just given.'"

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id.
Id., 571 S.E.2d at 164.
O.C.G.A. § 24-9-81 (1995).
Pryor v. State, 198 Ga. App. 588, 402 S.E.2d 338 (1991).
261 Ga. App. 263, 582 S.E.2d 213 (2003).
Id. at 268, 582 S.E.2d at 218.
Id.
Id. (quoting Park v. State, 230 Ga. App. 274, 280, 495 S.E.2d 886, 893 (1998)).
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Impeachment by Evidence of Conviction

The supreme court's decision in Smith v. State78 illustrates the fine,
but significant, distinction between using a conviction to impeach
general credibility and using a conviction to demonstrate a particular
point, e.g., bias. In Smith the defendant attempted to cross-examine a
prosecution witness about a first offender conviction. The prosecution
objected, contending that if defendant intended to impeach the witness
with evidence of a conviction, defendant had to introduce a certified copy
of the conviction. 7 On the surface, the prosecution's objection was
sound. It is well-established under Georgia law that the sole means of
impeaching the general credibility of a witness with a conviction is by
tendering a certified copy of the conviction. 78 However, there were two
problems with the prosecution's objection. First, because a sentence
under the First Offender Act 79 does not require an adjudication of guilt,
such a sentence cannot be used as a conviction to impeach a witness's
general credibility.80 Second, as defendant pointed out to the trial
court, he was not attempting to impeach the witness's general credibility
but rather was using the first offender sentence to demonstrate the
witness's bias.8 ' Nevertheless, the trial court agreed with the prosecution and forced defendant to tender a certified copy of the witness's first
offender sentence.82 The consequences of this decision were grave.
Defendant intended to introduce no evidence and, thus, gain the right
to give the concluding argument to the jury. However, because of the
trial court's decision forcing8 3him to tender a copy of the first offender
sentence, he lost that right.
On appeal, the supreme court acknowledged the first offender sentence
was not admissible to impeach the witness's general credibility.8 4 The
supreme court also acknowledged that defendant had a constitutional
right to demonstrate the witness's bias against him and that this
included the right to cross-examine the witness about his criminal

76. 276 Ga. 263, 577 S.E.2d 548 (2003).
77. Id. at 264, 577 S.E.2d at 549.
78. Love v. State, 199 Ga. App. 482, 483, 405 S.E.2d 308, 310 (1991).
79. O.C.G.A. §§ 42-8-62 to -65 (1997 & Supp. 2002).
80. Smith, 276 Ga. at 264, 577 S.E.2d at 549 (citing Matthews v. State, 268 Ga. 798,
801,493 S.E.2d 137, 140 (1997)); see also Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 43 MERCER L. REv.
257, 270 (1991).
81. Smith, 276 Ga. at 264-65, 577 S.E.2d at 549-50.
82. Id. at 264, 577 S.E.2d at 549.
83. Id.
84. Id.
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history.85 Thus, the supreme court agreed that defendant should have
been allowed to cross-examine the witness without being forced to tender
a certified copy of the first offender sentence. 8 The trial court erroneously deprived defendant of the right to give the concluding argument
to the jury. 7 Generally, the right to close to the jury is vigorously
protected and "harm is presumed when it is erroneously abridged."8
However, the supreme court concluded that the evidence against
defendant was so overwhelming that depriving him of this valuable right
was not harmful.89
C. "Opening the Door"
Just as extrinsic act evidence is generally inadmissible (subject to
many exceptions that have nearly swallowed the rule) when offered for
substantive purposes, such evidence also is inadmissible to impeach or
bolster witnesses.9" As an exception to this rule, Georgia law permits
the use of general bad character evidence to impeach a witness other
than a criminal defendant.9 ' Even criminal defendants who "open the
door" to general bad character evidence can be impeached with evidence
of specific instances of misconduct.92 Prior to the supreme court's
decision in Jones v. State,93 an adroit, or for that matter, a not-so-adroit
prosecutor could easily maneuver defendants into a situation in which
they could be impeached with evidence of their misconduct.94 For
example, before Jones, a defendant who protested on cross-examination
that he would not commit a particular act because he was not that type
of person subjected himself to impeachment with evidence of his criminal
record.9 5 Jones ended this practice.96
However, defendants can still find themselves faced with the difficult
dilemma of being forced to choose whether to forgo the introduction of
evidence to avoid opening the door to evidence of their prior misconduct.
For example, in Dyer v.State,97 defendant, on direct examination,

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id. at 265, 577 S.E.2d at 550.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Jones v. State, 257 Ga. 753, 363 S.E.2d 529 (1988).
O.C.G.A_ § 24-9-84 (1995).
Bland v. State, 198 Ga. App. 671, 672, 402 S.E.2d 782, 783 (1991).
257 Ga. 753, 363 S.E.2d 529 (1988).
Bland, 198 Ga. App. at 672, 402 S.E.2d at 783.
Id.
Jones, 257 Ga. at 758, 363 S.E.2d at 533.
261 Ga. App. 289, 585 S.E.2d 81 (2003).
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testified that he fled from police not because he had committed the
charged offense but rather because he was on probation for prior
criminal conduct. The trial court then allowed the prosecution to crossexamine defendant about the conduct that had placed him on probation. 98 The court of appeals affirmed.99 The court reasoned that
because defendant testified that he was on probation, the prosecution
was entitled to a thorough and sifting cross-examination with regard to
that prior offense, which, unfortunately for defendant, proved to be the
offense of unlawful flight from police.'0°
Similarly, in Leary v. State,' °' defendant, who was charged with
stealing rent payments that he was supposed to be collecting from
apartment tenants, testified that when he applied for the job, he advised
his prospective employer not to hire another applicant because the other
applicant was a thief. The prosecution then impeached defendant with
his own prior theft conviction.'0 2 On appeal, the court of appeals
reasoned that when defendant testified that the other applicant was10 a3
thief, he left the jury with the impression that he was not a thief.
This, the court held, entitled the prosecution to impeach defendant with
evidence of his own prior theft conviction.' 04
VII.

OPINION TESTIMONY

Since Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc.,' federal courts
have struggled mightily with their new gatekeeper role in scrutinizing
expert evidence. Georgia courts have in the past resisted appeals to
follow the United States Supreme Court's lead and require Georgia
courts to subject proffered expert testimony to rigorous pretrial
examination. During the current survey period, the court of appeals
again stood fast. In Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Carder,0 6 defendant
contended that plaintiff's expert testimony was not sufficiently grounded
in science to be admissible. Plaintiff's expert subjected plaintiff to
"challenge testing" to determine whether there was a link between
plaintiff's exposure to pesticides applied by defendant and plaintiff's
symptoms. The expert likened this testing to a cardiologist conducting

98. Id. at 289, 585 S.E.2d at 82.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 291, 585 S.E.2d at 83.
101. 256 Ga. App. 639, 569 S.E.2d 593 (2002).
102. Id. at 641, 569 S.E.2d at 595.
103. Id. at 642, 569 S.E.2d at 596.
104. Id., 569 S.E.2d at 595.
105. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
106. 258 Ga. App. 796, 575 S.E.2d 664 (2002).
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a stress test using a treadmill-exposure to show signs of strain on the
heart. In the case of pesticides, the expert simply exposed defendant to
various agents, including the 10 pesticides
at issue, to see whether
7
defendant's symptoms occurred.
Georgia courts apply the so-called Harper test 1 0 8 to determine the
admissibility of scientific evidence. A party relying on novel scientific
evidence must prove the procedure or technique has reached a scientific
stage of verifiable certainty.'0 9 This test is satisfied if the procedure
or technique at issue has been recognized in a substantial number of
other jurisdictions, or if the party offering the evidence can adduce
evidence establishing that the procedure or technique has reached the
requisite stage of development."0
The trial court must make this
determination from evidence presented by the parties, or on treatises, or
the rationale of cases in other jurisdictions."' If a procedure has been
recognized in a substantial number of courts, the trial court may take
judicial notice that the procedure has been established with verifiable

certainty. 112
In Orkin the plaintiff produced evidence that his expert's procedure
met the certainty and reliability standard and that it had gained general
acceptance in the scientific community. However, defendant argued that
the tests were not "double blinded," meaning neither the subject nor the
person conducting the tests knew whether a placebo was being used; the
expert's methodology had not been tested by others; the expert failed to
establish a written protocol for the testing; the test results had not been
published in professional literature; and the test results had not been
subject to peer review. The trial court acknowledged that such factors
are routine in Daubert analysis, but refused to apply them because
Georgia had rejected the Daubert test."3 Accordingly, the court of
appeals concluded that the trial court acted within its discretion when
it concluded that the testing procedure was sufficiently reliable and that
the absence of safeguards or controls or complaints about the expert's
methodology all related to the weight the
jury should give the expert's
1 4
testimony rather than its admissibility.

107. Id. at 797, 575 S.E.2d at 667.
108. See Harper v. State, 249 Ga. 519, 292 S.E.2d 389 (1982).
109. Id. at 525, 292 S.E.2d at 395.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 526, 292 S.E.2d at 395.
113. Orkin, 258 Ga. App. at 799-800, 575 S.E.2d at 668.
114. Id. at 800-01, 575 S.E.2d at 669. The supreme court granted certiorari on April
29, 2003 to the court of appeals in Orkin, leading to speculation that the court might be
willing to reconsider its refusal to adopt Daubert. However, the court dismissed the writ
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During this survey period, the supreme court and the court of appeals
continued their attempts to draw the line between permissible and
impermissible non-physician expert testimony on medical issues. As
reported in previous surveys, 115 the courts have held, with some
qualification, that non-medical experts can express opinions on causation
of injuries."'
However, as demonstrated during the current survey
period, that principle can hardly be considered well-entrenched. In
Adams v. State,"7 the trial court refused to allow a licensed clinical
social worker to testify about opinions she formed after she evaluated
defendant. She would have testified that defendant suffered from
paranoid-type schizophrenia, but the trial court excluded her testimony
on the grounds that whether defendant had a mental disorder was a
medical opinion, and only a medical doctor could give such testimony.118 The supreme court, however, noted that the expert had been
licensed by the Composite Board of the State of Georgia and that her
license allowed her to make diagnostic impressions."19 Further, she
had considerable experience in assessing patients to determine their
mental status. 2 ° This, the supreme court held, authorized her to
express her opinions concerning her evaluation of defendant.' 2 ' The
fact that she was not a medical doctor was a factor affecting the weight,
not the admissibility, of her opinion.'2 2 Three justices disagreed,
arguing that social workers were not competent to give psychiatric
diagnoses.'2 3 They disputed the majority's conclusion that state law
permitted the social worker to make diagnoses, noting that the
applicable statute only permitted the social worker to perform a
"'psychosocial evaluation.'"1 2 4 Using a dictionary, they noted that
"psychosocial" simply meant "'of or pertaining to the interaction between
social and psychological factors.' 1 25 They were especially concerned
about the impact of the majority's decision. 1 6 They feared that, "as a

of certiorari.
115. Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 50 MERCER L. REV. 229, 246-47 (1998); Treadwell,
54 MERCER L. REV., supra note 26, at 328-29.
116. Treadwell, 50 MERCER L. REV., supra note 115, at 246-47; Treadwell, 54 MERCER
L. REV., supra note 26, at 328-39.
117. 275 Ga. 867, 572 S.E.2d 545 (2002).
118. Id. at 868, 572 S.E.2d at 547.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 870, 572 S.E.2d at 548 (Carley, J., concurring specially).
124. Id. (quoting O.C.G.A. § 43-10A-12 (2002)).
125. Id., 572 S.E.2d at 549 (Carley, J., concurring specially).
126. Id. at 871, 572 S.E.2d at 549 (Carley, J., concurring specially).
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result of [the] opinion, trial courts [would] be reluctant to exercise their
discretion to prevent a witness from expressing an expert opinion on any
issue even7 if such witness is not qualified by experience or training to so
12
testify."
In Moresi v. Evans,12 plaintiff contended that the trial court improperly prevented his expert witness, a pharmacologist, from testifying
about the cause of plaintiff's medical problems.' 29 Plaintiff argued,
and the court agreed, that a pharmacologist is competent to testify
regarding the scientific effect of a particular drug. 3 °
However,
contrary to plaintiff's contention, the court of appeals held that the trial
court allowed the pharmacologist to testify about the effect on the
bladder of a depressed autoimmune system.'3 ' Indeed, the expert
testified that there was a causal relationship between the medication
plaintiff took and the symptoms she experienced. However, the trial
court did not permit the expert to testify about the effect of a depressed
central nervous system on a person's bladder, reasoning that this was a
matter for medical testimony.'32 "[H]e can testify as to direct causation of the drugs but we would not get into chain reaction testimony
from this expert."'33 The court's holding is narrow, and perhaps not
particularly illuminating: The trial court "did not abuse its discretion
in refusing to allow the pharmacologist to testify about the medical effect
of a depressed central nervous system on [plaintiff's] other organs.
Clearly, Georgia courts have held that non-medical experts can express
opinions on medical causation issues.'35 Whether such testimony is
limited to "direct causation" is an issue that is unresolved.
The supreme court's decision in Hines v. State13 6 illustrates the
proper scope of lay opinion testimony.137 In Hines the defendant, who
was charged with murder after he mistakenly shot a friend while turkey
hunting, contended the trial court improperly allowed a Department of
Natural Resources ranger to testify, as a lay witness, that "he would not
teach students in his hunter safety classes that [defendant's conduct]

127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id.
257 Ga. App. 670, 572 S.E.2d 327 (2002).
Id. at 675, 572 S.E.2d at 332.
Id.
Id. at 675, 575 S.E.2d at 332.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 674, 575 S.E.2d at 332; see also Adams, 275 Ga. at 868, 572 S.E.2d at 547.
276 Ga. 491, 578 S.E.2d 868 (2003).
Id. at 493, 494, 578 S.E.2d at 872, 873.
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The trial court allowed this testimo-

13
ny after ruling that the ranger could not testify as an expert. 1
This ruling, the supreme court held, was error.'" Lay witnesses
may give opinion testimony if the testimony is based upon their own
observations and their opinions are necessary to convey those same
observations to the jury.'
If the witness can describe the facts to the
jury sufficiently for the jury to reach its own opinion, lay opinion
testimony is not necessary."" In Hines the ranger's testimony was not
necessary to convey his observations.'" Rather, he testified as an
expert, i.e., based on his experience he formed an opinion that defendant's conduct was improper.'" However, the court concluded that the
witness was qualified as an expert to express such an opinion.' 45
Thus, although the court erroneously held that he was not an expert and
erroneously allowed him to testify as a lay witness, a reversal was not
required because the ranger was, in fact, an expert. 4 '

VIII.
A.

HEARSAY

Definition of Hearsay

As discussed below, and in many prior surveys,'47 the necessity
exception has nearly eviscerated the rule against hearsay. Now, it
appears the definition of hearsay itself, or at least the commonly
accepted definition of hearsay, is being narrowed.
If asked the definition of hearsay, most Georgia lawyers almost
certainly would say that hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered to
prove the truth of the matter asserted therein. In fact, this is the
definition of hearsay used most frequently by Georgia courts.'"
However, this is not Georgia's statutory definition of hearsay, which
defines hearsay as "that which does not derive its value solely from the
credit of the witness but rests mainly on the veracity and competency of

138. Id. at 494, 578 S.E.2d at 873.
139. Id. at 493, 494, 578 S.E.2d at 872, 873.
140. Id. at 494, 578 S.E.2d at 873.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145.

Id.

146. Id.
147. See generally Treadwell, 54 MERCER L. REV., supra note 26, at 309; Marc T.
Treadwell, Evidence, 53 MERCER L. REV. 295 (2001); Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 52
MERCER L. REV. 263 (2000); Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 51 MERCER L. REV. 279 (1999).
148. See, e.g., Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 44 MERCER L. REV. 213, 235-36 (1992).
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other persons." 49 Thus, a testifying witness's out-of-court statement
is hearsay under the common definition of hearsay, but it would not
necessarily be hearsay under the statutory definition because the
statement does not rest on the "veracity and competency" of someone
other than the witness. 5 ° However, Georgia's statutory definition has
been more of a historical oddity than a rule of evidence.
It may be that Georgia courts are returning to the statutory definition.
Last year's survey 1 ' discussed Armstead v. State, 52 in which the
court held that a hearsay statement was admissible because the
declarant testified at trial.'53 During the current survey period, the
court of appeals relied on Armstead to hold that hearsay evidence is
admissible when the declarant testifies at trial."M
In Conley v.
State,'5 5 the court of appeals, relying on Armstead, recognized that "the
modern trend regarding hearsay evidence is to allow the out of court
declaration
where the declarant is present and may be cross-exam156
ined."
Thus, the rule against hearsay is under assault from two fronts. First,
exceptions, particularly the necessity exception, to the hearsay rule are
being expanded, and second, even if an exception applies, Georgia
appears to have recognized the principle that a hearsay statement can
nevertheless be admitted if the declarant testifies at trial.'5 7 Ironically, in doing so, Georgia courts have, in fact if not expressly, resurrected
the long thought dead statutory definition of hearsay.
B.

The Necessity Exception
For those interested in the historical development of Georgia's
necessity exception, previous surveys can be reviewed, particularly a
1996 survey, which chronicled the early days of the exception.5 5 For
practitioners, it may be sufficient to know that the necessity exception,
for good or ill, is here to stay, and it has dramatically changed the
landscape of hearsay testimony.'59 However, the necessity exception

149. O.C.G.A. § 24-3-1 (1995).
150. Id.
151. Treadwell, 54 MERCER L. REV., supra note 26, at 332-33.
152. 255 Ga. App. 385, 565 S.E.2d 579 (2002).
153. Id. at 386, 565 S.E.2d at 580.
154. Conley v. State, 257 Ga. App. 563, 564, 571 S.E.2d 554, 555 (2002).
155. 257 Ga. App. 563, 571 S.E.2d 554 (2002).
156. Id. at 564, 571 S.E.2d at 555.
157. Id.
158. Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 48 MERCER L. REv. 323, 351-54 (1996).
159. One change, perhaps everyone can agree, is positive. The availability of the
necessity exception means that courts less frequently resort to the resgestae exception, and
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is still relatively young and in need of fine-tuning. Thus, during this
survey, as during previous periods, the appellate courts spent considerable time attempting to define the parameters of the necessity exception.
Most notably, there was a hint that perhaps the courts are contemplating reining in the widespread use of the necessity exception.
In Phillips v. State,'60 the trial court admitted a videotaped statement made by a victim to the police.' 61 Citing the now well-established elements of the necessity exception-the declarant must be
unavailable to testify; there must be particularized guarantees of the
statement's trustworthiness; and the statement must be both relevant
to a material fact and more probative regarding that fact than any other
evidence-the supreme court concluded that the trial court erroneously
admitted the statement.16 2 The witness could not be located despite
a diligent search, and thus, he was unavailable." However, the court
found that the prosecution failed to establish that the statement
contained particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.' 6
Merely because Ridaux made his statement to police within hours of
the shooting and never recanted or contradicted his statement does not,
standing alone, demonstrate that the statement was sufficiently
trustworthy to warrant its admission under the necessity exception.
Only where "the declarant's truthfulness is so clear from the surrounding circumstances that the test of cross examination would be of
marginal utility" does the hearsay rule not bar admission of the
hearsay statement at trial. 65
Moreover, the videotaped statement was no more probative than the
testimony of other witnesses." Thus, the hearsay failed to meet two
of the criteria for admission under the necessity exception.' 7
Perhaps attempting to send a message, the supreme court cautioned
trial courts about the widespread use of the necessity exception to admit
hearsay evidence:
The criteria for admission of hearsay evidence under the necessity
exception are not mere niceties. Unless a party moving for a hearsay

the only thing certain about that exception is that nothing is certain or clear; it is an
inexplicable enigma. Andrews v. State, 249 Ga. 223, 225, 290 S.E.2d 71, 73 (1982).
160. 275 Ga. 595, 571 S.E.2d 361 (2002).
161. Id. at 597, 571 S.E.2d at 365.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. (quoting Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 820 (1990)).
166. Id.
167. Id. at 598, 571 S.E.2d at 365.
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statement's admission comes forward and establishes that all three
criteria are clearly satisfied, the trial court must deny admission and
the prohibition against hearsay evidence must be upheld.16
As is often the case, however, the fact that there was other evidence
more probative of the statement also 1meant
that the erroneous
69
admission of the statement was harmless.
The court in Phillips appeared to call into question the long line of
cases that have held that hearsay statements are trustworthy simply
because they were made to police. In Yancey v. State, 7 ° the supreme
court took direct aim at those cases. In Yancey the trial court admitted
a videotaped statement made by a witness to police during an official
investigation. The trial court found further signs of trustworthiness
from the fact that the witness initialed each page of the statement, he
gave the statement without being threatened and with the benefit of
71
Miranda1
warnings, and he did not recant his statement before trial
(he did recant after trial). At the time of trial, the witness could not be
located, and the videotaped statement was admitted based upon the
testimony of the detective who interviewed the witness.1 2 His testimony, and the circumstances surrounding the giving of the testimony,
led the supreme court to question just how trustworthy the statement
was. 73 The witness was under suspicion for the crime of murder when
he was called in for questioning. The detective said the witness was
reluctant to talk and refused to take a polygraph examination. Finally,
the witness's brother and mother were also potential suspects.'7 4 On
the other hand, the supreme court noted that many cases have held that
statements given to police were not sufficiently trustworthy, and the
court proceeded to examine that line of cases. 1 5 Acknowledging that
it had "struggled" with the significance to attach to what it called "the
'official investigation' factor,"' 76 the court concluded that each case
must be decided on the basis of its facts. 77 The implication appears
to be that the mere fact that a statement is given during the course of
a police investigation does not necessarily satisfy the trustworthiness
requirement.
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170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

Id.
Id., 571 S.E.2d at 366.
275 Ga. 550, 570 S.E.2d 269 (2002).
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1996).
Yancey, 275 Ga. at 551-52, 570 S.E.2d at 271.
Id. at 556, 570 S.E.2d at 274.
Id.
Id. at 553, 570 S.E.2d at 272.
Id. at 554, 570 S.E.2d at 273.
Id. at 555, 570 S.E.2d at 273.
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The supreme court also warned courts about citing corrobo -ating
evidence as indicia of reliability. 178 Such evidence is really a factor in
determining
whether admission of the hearsay statement was harm179

less.

The court then turned to a subject rarely addressed by Georgia
appellate courts-whether the admission of the hearsay statement
violated defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confront his witnesses. 80 As pointed out in a previous survey,'8' the necessity exception
test is crafted from confrontation clause analysis intended to determine
when hearsay evidence can be admitted without violating a defendant's
constitutional rights.'8 2 A hearsay statement, even though admissible
pursuant to some exception to the hearsay rule, may nevertheless violate
a defendant's right to confront the witnesses providing evidence against
him. 8 3 The United States Supreme Court has held that hearsay
evidence may be admitted in criminal trials if it is necessary and if the
statement has "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.""
Trustworthiness is generally established by the fact that the hearsay
statement falls within a firmly established exception to the hearsay
rule.'
However, the fact that the hearsay statement is not admissible pursuant to a firmly established exception is not a fatal constitutional flaw.8 6 The statement may, nevertheless,
be admissible if the
8 7
requisite trustworthiness can be established.
In Yancey the Georgia Supreme Court acknowledged that the necessity
exception is not a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule, and thus,
the prosecution had to establish the trustworthiness of the statement."s Just as the prosecution could not establish the trustworthiness of the statement for purposes of admission under the necessity
exception, it also could not establish the trustworthiness of a statement
for purposes of confrontation clause analysis.8 9

178. Id.
179. Id.

180. Id. at 555-56, 570 S.E.2d at 273-74.
181. Treadwell, 48 MERCER L. REV., supra note 158, at 323, 351-53.
182. Id.
183. See, e.g., Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 42 MERCER L. REV. 223, 251-52 (1990);
Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 45 MERCER L. REV. 229, 247-48 (1993).
184. See, e.g., White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 363 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting);
Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 201 (1987) (quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56,
66 (1980)).
185. See, e.g., United States v. Deeb, 13 F.3d 1532, 1536 (11th Cir. 1994).
186. Id. at 1536-37.
187. Id.
188. Yancey, 275 Ga. at 557, 570 S.E.2d at 275.
189. Id.
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The supreme court's decision in Yancey perhaps suggests that Georgia
courts, in their necessity exception analysis, should also consider the
constitutional issues of admitting hearsay evidence. At the very least,
as a result of Yancey, defense attorneys are likely to be more prone to
raise federal constitutional challenges to hearsay evidence.
In Myers v. State, 90 the supreme court took on another supposed
indication of reliability-the fact that a hearsay statement is made to a
trusted confidant. 1 ' In Myers the statement was made by the victim
to a neighbor, who was a friend of the victim. However, there was no
evidence the declarant and the neighbor had a relationship in which the
victim placed great confidence in the witness and turned to the witness
for help with personal problems. 92 The evidence was simply insufficient to establish the "close confidant" indication of reliability, and
therefore, the trial court erroneously admitted the statement pursuant
to the necessity exception. 9 ' Again, however, there was cumulative
evidence on the same point, so the admission of the statement was
harmless error."M
However, it would be far too much to suggest that the necessity
exception has reached its high water mark, a point made by a sharply
divided supreme court in Wright v. State. 9 ' In Wright the defendant,
who was convicted of charges, including murder, stemming from the
death of his wife and friend, contended that the trial court improperly
admitted statements made by his wife." Some of the statements were
made to friends, and the supreme court found that those statements met
the confidant test.' 9' However, the trial court also admitted notes
made by the wife after defendant filed for divorce. Because these notes
were made in contemplation of the divorce litigation, defendant argued
they were inherently untrustworthy.'
While acknowledging that
such statements can be dubious, the court held that they were not
necessarily untrustworthy and, in any event, their admission was
harmless.'9
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275 Ga. 709, 572 S.E.2d 606 (2002).
Id. at 712, 572 S.E.2d at 610.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 713, 572 S.E.2d at 610.
276 Ga. 454, 579 S.E.2d 214 (2003).
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Three justices dissented."' Chief Justice Fletcher, citing Yancey,
argued that the statements of friends were inadmissible because there
was other more probative evidence introduced at trial on the same
subject matter.2 ' In a separate opinion, Justice Sears criticized the
majority for using corroborating evidence to establish the trustworthiness of the victim's notes about the upcoming divorce litigation. 0 2 As
the court held in Yancey, Justice Sears argued, corroborating evidence
should not be used to determine admissibility.203 Moreover, the fact
that the statements were made in connection with the impending
divorce, if anything, established that they were not trustworthy-spouses
in the throes of divorce may be inclined to make self-serving statements
that tend to portray the marital relationship in an inaccurate or biased
light, a point that can hardly be argued.20 4
The court of appeals also seemed to be concerned about the rapid
expansion of the hearsay exception and, in Lighten v. State,0 5 perhaps
intended to send a message of its own. In Lighten the defendant
contended that the trial court erroneously admitted an audiotaped
statement from his uncle. The uncle made the statement to police more
than four months after the events in question and at a time when he
hoped to benefit from making the statement.2 ' Even though the
statement was made to police, it was not sufficiently trustworthy to be
admitted under the necessity exception.2 7
While the prosecution
pointed to corroborating evidence, the court, citing Yancey, responded
that the supreme court had held that corroboration is not an appropriate
factor in determining admissibility.20 8 However, as the court also said
in Yancey, corroboration evidence is a factor in determining whether the
admission of the statement was harmless, and, sure enough, in Lighten,
the fact that there was other evidence of the same facts led the court of
appeals to conclude that the erroneous admission of the hearsay was
harmless.0 9

200. Id. at 463-66, 579 S.E.2d at 223-25. Chief Justice Fletcher, Presiding Justice
Sears, and Justice Carley each filed dissenting opinions. Id.
201. Id. at 463, 579 S.E.2d at 223 (Fletcher, C.J., dissenting).
202. Id. at 464, 579 S.E.2d at 223 (Sears, J., dissenting).
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. 259 Ga. App. 280, 576 S.E.2d 658 (2003).
206. Id. at 283, 576 S.E.2d at 662.
207. Id. at 284, 576 S.E.2d at 662.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 286, 576 S.E.2d at 663.
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It is an anomaly, at least to some, that the necessity exception is
freely used in criminal cases, but only sparingly used in civil cases,21
a point illustrated in Torstenson v. Doe.2 ' In Torstenson the plaintiff
contended that a piece of metal flew from a truck and struck the
windshield of her van. Unfortunately, the truck left the scene and the
identity of the driver was unknown. Thus, plaintiff attempted to recover
from her uninsured motorist carrier. To establish that the event
actually happened, and thus implicate the uninsured motorist carrier,
plaintiff relied upon statements made by her husband, an eyewitness to
the incident. 12 Unfortunately, the husband had died. Accordingly,
plaintiff offered "virtually identical affidavits" from two of her adult
children.2 13 Plaintiff contended that these affidavits were admissible
under the necessity exception.2 14 Quoting from the trial court's careful
review of the affidavits, the court noted that the "'affidavits give the
court no details or flavor of the declarations to determine if they meet
the high standard of being a 'circumstantial guaranty of trustworthiness'
or 'something the law considers the substitute for the oath of the
declarant in his cross examination.'"2 15 The court of appeals added
that "the statements were made to family members rather than to a
disinterested third-party such as the police ... and that the statements
were in the [husband's] self interest."21 1 Considering the totality of the
circumstances, the court of appeals concluded that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion when it concluded that the affidavits were not
sufficiently trustworthy to be admissible under the necessity exception.21 7
Of course, during the survey period, there were also routine necessity
exception cases or at least routine in the sense that the courts, with
little discussion, admitted hearsay evidence that just a few years ago
would have been inadmissible.2 8

210. Compare this treatment with extrinsic act evidence where the same phenomenon
exists.
211. 257 Ga. App. 389, 571 S.E.2d 432 (2002).
212. Id. at 389-90, 571 S.E.2d at 433.
213. Id. at 390, 571 S.E.2d at 435.
214. Id. at 391, 571 S.E.2d at 434.
215. Id. at 392, 571 S.E.2d at 435.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. See generally Barrett v. State, 257 Ga. App. 444, 445-46, 571 S.E.2d 202, 205
(2003) (holding that trustworthiness was established by the fact that the statement was
made to police during the course of an official investigation); Pullin v. State, 258 Ga. App.
37,41,572 S.E.2d 722, 726 (2002) (holding that trustworthiness was established by the fact
that the declarant and the witness confided in one another albeit for a very short period
of time); Watkins v. State, 276 Ga. 578, 580, 581 S.E.2d 23, 26 (2003) (holding that
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Statements of Co-Conspirators

In Arevalo v. State,219 the supreme court arguably, and certainly in
the minds of the dissenting justices, significantly expanded the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule.22 ° In Arevalo the defendant,
his brother, and a third person robbed and then shot employees of a
restaurant where defendant had previously been employed. After his
arrest, defendant admitted his participation in the armed robbery but
claimed the third accomplice was the triggerman. At trial, the court
admitted, pursuant to the co-conspirator exception, a letter allegedly
written by defendant's brother and sent to defendant. The prosecution
used this letter to support its argument that defendant actually shot the
victims. 221 Before addressing defendant's contention that the letter did
not fall within the co-conspirator exception, the supreme court considered whether the state had properly "authenticated" the letter.222
Noting that a document can be authenticated by circumstantial evidence,
the court concluded that the totality of the circumstances sufficiently
established that defendant's brother authored the letter.2
Justice
Thompson, joined by Justice Sears, dissented from this holding, but the
court dismissed their arguments because, in the view of the majority, the
dissenters raised "chain of custody" issues and defendant did not object
to the letter on that basis. 2
Justice Thompson's dissent adds a few more facts to the mix.225 The
prosecutor allegedly received a photocopy of the letter from an attorney,
who in turn received the letter from a client housed in the same jail as
either defendant or his brother, it was not clear which. Neither this
inmate nor defendant's brother testified at trial, and the only evidence
adduced to authenticate the letter was the testimony of an investigator
from the prosecutor's office. According to this investigator, the inmate
told him that he had delivered letters for defendant's brother. 226 The

trustworthiness was established by the declarant's and the witness's "close, trusting and
loving relationship"); Hill v. State, 258 Ga. App. 339, 341, 574 S.E.2d 394, 397 (2002)
(holding that trustworthiness was established by the fact that the statement was made to
the declarant's son).
219. 275 Ga. 392, 567 S.E.2d 303 (2002).
220. See id. at 399-401, 567 S.E.2d at 310-11 (Fletcher, C.J., dissenting); id. at 402-04,
567 S.E.2d at 311-12 (Thompson, J., dissenting).
221. Id. at 391-92, 395-96, 567 S.E.2d at 305, 307.
222. Id. at 395, 567 S.E.2d at 307.
223. Id. at 395, 396, 567 S.E.2d at 307.
224. Id. at 396, 567 S.E.2d at 307.
225. Id. at 402-03, 567 S.E.2d at 311-12 (Thompson, J., dissenting).
226. Id. at 402, 567 S.E.2d at 312 (Thompson, J., dissenting).
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investigator further testified that when the brother was confronted with
the letter, he appeared "'kind of shocked'" and acknowledged that the
227
letter was a correct copy of the letter he had written to his brother.
As Justice Thompson pointed out, all of this testimony was hearsay and
should not have been admissible to authenticate the letter.228 Justice
Thompson also noted that the inmate arguably had his own agenda-to
obtain favorable treatment for his own crimes.229 Putting aside the
hearsay evidence, Justice Thompson concluded that "the totality of the
admissible circumstantial evidence of the letter's authenticity... [was]
insufficient to authorize the letters introduction into evidence."23 °
The difference between the majority and Justice Thompson may well
be one of semantics. To the majority, Justice Thompson's point that the
state failed to offer admissible evidence establishing how a copy of the
letter came to be in prosecution's possession, and whether defendant's
brother actually wrote the letter, all related to whether the state had
proven a chain of custody.23 1 However, Justice Thompson never
mentioned chain of custody; to him, the "totality of the circumstances"
simply failed to authenticate the letter.3 2 For the majority, the
contents of the letter itself provided sufficient circumstantial evidence
to authenticate the letter.233 Given the additional facts provided by
Justice Thompson's dissent, it appears that the majority's threshold for
authentication was rather low.
The majority then turned to the issue of whether the letter was
admissible as a statement of a co-conspirator.2 4 First, the majority
reasoned there was a conspiracy between defendant, his brother, and
their accomplice to commit the armed robbery, and the murders occurred
during the course of this conspiracy. 235 The majority acknowledged
that before the letter was written, both brothers admitted their
involvement in the armed robbery and identified their accomplice as an
2 37
additional

participant;2

36

therefore,

that

conspiracy

was

over.

However, neither brother implicated the other in the murders, but
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rather contended that their accomplice was the triggerman.2
"Thus,
while the conspiracy to commit an armed robbery with [the accomplice]
may have been over, a conspiracy between the Arevalo brothers with
regard to the murders was still very much ongoing.""'9 Because a
conspiracy continues so long as the participants attempt to conceal the
conspiracy, the conspiracy between defendant and his brother was
ongoing. 240
This reasoning confounded Chief Justice Fletcher, who contended that
the majority had "unwisely extend[ed] the already expansive hearsay
exception for co-conspirator's statements under state law to allow the
admission of an out of court statement made after the conspiracy
ended."241 Chief Justice Fletcher noted that it was well-established
that a conspiracy ends when one conspirator incriminates another; thus,
this conspiracy ended when the brothers were arrested, confessed, and
implicated both themselves and their accomplice.242 Chief Justice
Fletcher found no support for the majority's theory that there were two
conspiracies, one involving the armed robbery and another between the
brothers to blame their accomplice for the murder.2
D.

Business Records Exception

As discussed in previous surveys, 2 " Georgia's business record
exception 245 does not permit the admission of opinions or diagnoses
contained in medical records. 2 " However, in Kohl v. Tirado,2 47 the
court held that medical records containing opinions and diagnoses may
be admitted if "'the proper foundation is laid, i.e., the person who
entered such diagnostic opinions and conclusions upon the record must
qualify as an expert and relate the facts upon which the entry was
based.'" 2" In Kohl the doctor, whose records were admitted pursuant

238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 399-400, 567 S.E.2d at 310 (Fletcher, C.J., dissenting).
242. Id. at 400, 567 S.E.2d at 310 (Fletcher, C.J., dissenting).
243. Id.
244. See, e.g., Treadwell, 47 MERCER L. REV., supra note 65, at 127, 149.
245. O.C.G.A. § 24-3-14 (1995).
246. See, e.g., Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 49 MERCER L. REV. 149, 167 (1997). In this
regard, Georgia's hearsay exception for business records is much narrower than the
business records exception in the Federal Rule of Evidence, which allows the admission of
business records containing opinions or diagnoses. FED. R. EVID. 803(6).
247. 256 Ga. App. 681, 569 S.E.2d 576 (2002).
248. Id. at 683-84, 569 S.E.2d at 578 (quoting Cassano v. Pilgreen's, Inc., 117 Ga. App.
260, 261, 160 S.E.2d 439, 440 (1968)).
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to the business record exception, testified at trial, so the opinions and
diagnoses in his medical records were admissible.249
E.

Adoptive Admissions

In White v. State,250 the supreme court reached what many will
regard, including dissenting Justices Fletcher and Hunstein, as an
unusual result in the case of an alleged adoptive admission. In White
the defendant's neighbor testified about a conversation she had with
defendant's wife in the presence of defendant. At some point during the
conversation, defendant signaled his wife to stop talking.2 5 This, the
trial court and the supreme court agreed, was "an adoptive admission"
of the wife's incriminating statements.2 52 Defendant "actively responded to Josephine's statements by gesturing for her to keep quiet, thereby
arguably acknowledging that the inculpatory statements were true and
that the information should not be disclosed." 2 3 Chief Justice Fletcher
essentially called for a reality check; the fact that defendant gestured to
his wife to stop talking does not naturally mean that he agreed with
what his wife was saying.2 14 "In fact, the usual human experience
would consider such a gesture to mean that the husband disagrees with
his wife's comments."255
F

Miscellaneous

Perhaps contrary to the general trend expanding the scope of
exceptions to the hearsay rule, Georgia courts continue to adhere to the
principle that hearsay evidence is generally not admissible to explain a
law enforcement officer's conduct. 5 6 In Teague v. State,257 the supreme court unequivocally ruled that prosecutors could not use the
"explain conduct" exception of the hearsay rule to admit hearsay
evidence:
At heart, a criminal prosecution is designed to find the truth of what
a defendant did, and, on occasion, of why he did it. It is most unusual
that a prosecution will properly concern itself with why an investigating officer did something.

249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.

Id. at 683, 569 S.E.2d at 578.
276 Ga. 583, 581 S.E.2d 18 (2003).
Id. at 587, 581 S.E.2d at 22.
Id.
Id. at 587, 588, 581 S.E.2d at 22.
Id. at 589, 581 S.E.2d at 23 (Fletcher, C.J., concurring specially).
Id.
Teague v. State, 252 Ga. 534, 536-37, 314 S.E.2d 910, 912 (1984).
252 Ga. 534, 314 S.E.2d 910 (1984).
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If the hearsay rule is to remain a part of our law, then O.C.G.A. section
24-3-2... must be contained within its proper limit. Otherwise, the
repetition of the rote words "to explain conduct" can become imprimatur for the admission of rumor, gossip, and speculation.258
During the current survey period, the court of appeals, in Britton v.
State,2 59 relied on Teague to reverse defendant's conviction. 2 °
In
Britton the trial court admitted testimony that an anonymous informant
told a detective that defendant would be driving a particular vehicle and
would have concealed money and drugs under a false bottom in the
vehicle's console.
Based on this information, the law enforcement
officers located defendant's vehicle. Defendant consented to the search
of his vehicle and officers found cocaine, cash, and a gun in a space
beneath the console. Defendant contended that the trial court improperly admitted the anonymous caller's hearsay statements.2 6 ' The court
of appeals agreed and reversed.26 2
However, in two other cases, the court of appeals held that Teague did
not require the exclusion of hearsay evidence offered to explain police
conduct.263
In Morrow v. State,2
the trial court admitted a law
enforcement officer's testimony that he was dispatched to a scene
because of two unruly, intoxicated males. When the officer arrived, the
drunks were gone, but the dispatcher provided the officer with a
description of their vehicle, including the license plate number. Based
on this information, the police officer stopped defendant's truck.
Defendant was convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol. On
appeal, defendant contended that the information provided by the
dispatcher to the law enforcement officer was not admissible. 265 The
court of appeals disagreed, concluding that this was one of the "'rare
instances'" contemplated by Teague that warranted the admission of
hearsay to explain police conduct.2 66 The difference appeared to be the
issue on which the hearsay evidence was offered. In Morrow that issue
was whether the law enforcement officer had a reasonable and articulable suspicion to justify stopping defendant's vehicle. 267 The informa-

258. Id. at 536, 314 S.E.2d at 912.
259. 257 Ga. App. 441, 571 S.E.2d 451 (2002).
260. Id. at 442-43, 571 S.E.2d at 453.
261. Id. at 442, 571 S.E.2d at 452.
262. Id. at 442, 443, 571 S.E.2d at 453.
263. Morrow v. State, 257 Ga. App. 707, 708, 572 S.E.2d 58, 59 (2002); Penland v.
State, 258 Ga. App. 659, 663, 574 S.E.2d 880, 883 (2002).
264. 257 Ga. App. 707, 572 S.E.2d 58 (2002).
265. Id. at 708, 572 S.E.2d at 59.
266. Id. (quoting Scruggs v. State, 227 Ga. App. 35, 36, 488 S.E.2d 110, 111 (1997)).
267. Id.
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tion provided by the dispatcher was found admissible to explain why the
stop was justified.2
Similarly, in Penland v. State,269 the court of appeals held that the
nature of the issue warranted the admission of evidence to explain police
conduct.270 In Penland the defendant was charged with obstruction of
a law enforcement officer, and the court reasoned that to prove that
charge, the prosecution had to demonstrate that the police were acting
in the lawful discharge of their official duties and, consequently, that
they had reasonable grounds to stop defendant. 271'
Accordingly,
hearsay evidence was admissible to explain that the officers were
lawfully discharging their official duties when they stopped defendant.272

268. Id.
269. 258 Ga. App. 659, 574 S.E.2d 880 (2002).
270. Id. at 661, 574 S.E.2d at 882.
271. Id. at 659, 660, 574 S.E.2d at 882.
272. Id. at 663, 574 S.E.2d at 883.

